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Abstract 26 
Negative affect in humans and animals is known to cause individuals to interpret 27 
ambiguous stimuli pessimistically, a phenomenon termed ‘cognitive bias’. Here, 28 
we used captive European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) to test the hypothesis that 29 
a reduction in environmental conditions, from enriched to non-enriched cages, 30 
would engender negative affect, and hence ‘pessimistic’ biases. We also explored 31 
whether individual differences in stereotypic behaviour (repetitive somersaulting) 32 
predicted ‘pessimism’. Eight birds were trained on a novel conditional 33 
discrimination task with differential rewards, in which background shade (light or 34 
dark) determined which of two covered dishes contained a food reward. The 35 
reward was small when the background was light, but large when the background 36 
was dark. We then presented background shades intermediate between those 37 
trained to assess the birds’ bias to choose the dish associated with the smaller 38 
food reward (a ‘pessimistic’ judgement) when the discriminative stimulus was 39 
ambiguous. Contrary to predictions, changes in the level of cage enrichment had 40 
no effect on ‘pessimism’. However, changes in the latency to choose and 41 
probability of expressing a choice suggested that birds learnt rapidly that trials 42 
with ambiguous stimuli were unreinforced. Individual differences in performance 43 
of stereotypies did predict ‘pessimism’. Specifically, birds that somersaulted were 44 
more likely to choose the dish associated with the smaller food reward in the 45 
presence of the most ambiguous discriminative stimulus. We propose that 46 
somersaulting is part of a wider suite of behavioural traits indicative of a stress 47 
response to captive conditions that is symptomatic of a negative affective state.   48 
  49 
 50 
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Introduction 52 
There is an extensive body of literature in human psychology showing that 53 
emotions can influence cognitive processes (Williams et al. 1997). For example, 54 
negative affective states such as anxiety can cause increased attention to 55 
threatening stimuli (Bar-Haim et al. 2007), and can increase the likelihood that 56 
ambiguous information will be interpreted pessimistically (Eysenck et al. 1991). 57 
These cognitive biases are sensitive both to short-term changes in anxiety (i.e. 58 
state anxiety) and stable individual differences in anxiety (i.e. trait anxiety) (Bar-59 
Haim et al. 2007). Similar cognitive biases have also been shown to occur in 60 
animals whose states have been manipulated in various ways. Studies in 61 
laboratory rats (Rattus norvegicus; Harding et al. 2004; Burman et al. 2008a) 62 
and captive wild-caught European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris; Bateson and 63 
Matheson 2007; Matheson et al. 2008) have demonstrated that changes in 64 
husbandry that are likely to engender negative affective states cause ‘pessimistic’ 65 
biases in the animals’ interpretation of ambiguous stimuli, i.e. they have an 66 
expectancy of a more negative outcome. For example, in a previous experiment 67 
we trained starlings on a go/no-go task to discriminate between white and dark 68 
grey cardboard lids associated respectively with palatable and unpalatable 69 
mealworms hidden underneath. Once the birds had learnt to flip the white lids 70 
and avoid the dark grey lids, we measured their judgement biases (a form of 71 
cognitive bias) by presenting them with ambiguous lids of intermediate shades of 72 
grey. When the birds were housed in un-enriched cages, they were more 73 
reluctant to approach and flip the ambiguous lids than when they were housed in 74 
enriched cages (Bateson and Matheson 2007). We interpreted this result as a 75 
pessimistic judgement bias in birds housed in environmental conditions known to 76 
be associated with poorer welfare. Cognitive bias tasks have been tentatively 77 
supported as a new tool for diagnosing negative affective states in captive 78 
animals (Paul et al. 2005; Mendl et al. 2009). However, as we will explain below, 79 
a number of theoretical and empirical issues remain (see also Mendl et al. 2009). 80 
Our aims in the current paper are (1) to develop a novel judgement task for 81 
measurement of cognitive bias in starlings intended to improve on previous 82 
tasks; and (2), to extend previous work in animals, by asking whether cognitive 83 
biases are correlated with individual differences in the incidence of abnormal 84 
behaviour, specifically stereotypies, that might also reflect trait anxiety. We 85 
present the background to each of these aims in more detail below. 86 
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Judgement bias tasks for animals 87 
The tasks developed so far to measure judgment biases in animals are based on 88 
the original design of (Harding et al. 2004). Subjects are initially trained to 89 
associate one stimulus, S+, with a reward (generally food) and another S- with 90 
either a reward of lower value (e.g less food), or a punishment (e.g. white noise 91 
or a noxious food item). S+ and S- are chosen to lie on a continuous stimulus 92 
spectrum (e.g. a frequency range for auditory stimuli, a spectral range for visual 93 
stimuli or a range of directions for spatial stimuli). To measure a cognitive bias, 94 
subjects’ responses to novel stimuli (‘probes’) that are intermediate between the 95 
trained stimuli are recorded in extinction (i.e. probe trials are not reinforced, 96 
avoiding any confound of reinforcement).  A subject is regarded as showing a 97 
pessimistic judgement bias if it demonstrates a higher probability of exhibiting 98 
the response appropriate to the S- stimulus, than either that same subject in a 99 
more positive affective state or when compared to control subjects in a more 100 
positive state.  101 
To date, the majority of published cognitive bias tasks have used a go/no-102 
go procedure (Harding et al. 2004; Bateson and Matheson 2007; Burman et al. 103 
2008a). In a go/no-go task the subject is required to respond by performing a 104 
behaviour (e.g. lever press) in response to S+, but to refrain from responding to 105 
S-. However, interpretation of data from a go/no-go task is complicated by the 106 
possibility that negative affective states are often associated with changes in 107 
general activity and feeding motivation. Therefore, on a go/no-go task, it is 108 
possible that subjects in a more negative affective state show a reduced 109 
probability of responding because they are less motivated to exploit a signalled 110 
food source, rather than because they interpret the ambiguous stimulus 111 
pessimistically. Thus, go/no-go tasks could be measuring a more general 112 
response bias as opposed to the assumed biased judgement of the ambiguous 113 
stimulus. 114 
To address the above problem with go/no-go tasks we, and others, have 115 
advocated the use of choice tasks whereby subjects are required to make a 116 
different active response to both S+ and S- stimuli (e.g. Matheson et al. 2008; 117 
Enkel et al. 2009); see also unpublished studies cited in Mendl et al. 2009). This 118 
experimental design allows the effects of a response bias and a judgement bias to 119 
be distinguished: the former should result in reduced responding to all stimuli 120 
whilst the latter should result in reduced responding only to ambiguous stimuli. In 121 
a previous study with starlings we used an operant task in which birds were 122 
required to choose (by pecking) a red or green key to classify a light stimulus as 123 
S+ or S- (Matheson et al. 2008). However, this task has a number of practical 124 
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limitations including the length of time taken to train the birds, the requirement 125 
for moderate levels of food deprivation and the requirement to catch and handle 126 
the birds daily to transfer them to the operant chambers (a potentially anxiety-127 
inducing procedure; Rich and Romero 2005). In the current paper we present a 128 
novel choice task that is a modification of the simple lid-flipping task described 129 
earlier (Bateson and Matheson 2007). The task was designed to be quick to train, 130 
and minimally disruptive to the birds, with all training and experimental 131 
procedures conducted in the home cages (c.f. Matheson et al. 2008).  132 
In line with previous cognitive bias experiments, we manipulated the 133 
affective state of the birds by altering the level of environmental enrichment 134 
provided in their cages (Bateson and Matheson 2007; Matheson et al. 2008). 135 
There are extensive data from a wide range of species showing that provision of 136 
more enrichment in captive animals’ cages is associated with better welfare 137 
(Young 2003), and we have data from our own laboratory showing that starlings 138 
in enriched cages display less abnormal behaviour (Asher 2007). We used a 139 
repeated measures design involving a sequential change from environmentally 140 
enriched conditions, to non-enriched conditions and then returning to enriched 141 
conditions. This design delivers greater statistical power in a study involving low 142 
numbers of subjects (a constraint of the intensive training required), and 143 
additionally allows us to examine how starlings respond to both reduction and 144 
improvement in their environmental conditions.  We have previously found that 145 
starlings show a greater change in cognitive bias in response to a reduction in 146 
environmental conditions than to an improvement (Bateson and Matheson 2007), 147 
adding to many results showing that animals’ responses to a given situation 148 
depend on what they have previously experienced (Flaherty 1996; Bergvall et al. 149 
2007; Burman et al. 2008b). 150 
We hypothesised that starlings would show more pessimistic judgement 151 
biases in the non-enriched conditions compared with the enriched conditions. We 152 
also hypothesised that the birds would show a greater response to the removal of 153 
environmental enrichment than to its reinstatement in the final stage of the 154 
experiment. 155 
Individual differences 156 
The published cognitive bias studies in animals thus far have all examined 157 
whether judgement biases are sensitive to relatively short-term manipulations of 158 
state (Harding et al. 2004; Bateson and Matheson 2007; Burman et al. 2008a; 159 
Matheson et al. 2008). However, the literature in humans suggests that there are 160 
also stable individual (‘trait’) differences in both affect and pessimism (Bar-Haim 161 
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et al. 2007). How individual animals cope with captivity is not only a matter of 162 
animal welfare, but is also of concern for the scientific validity of studies related 163 
to cognition. Differences in coping ability might be reflected in an animal’s 164 
affective state and hence in the choices they make, regardless of the 165 
experimental treatment. Repetitive, abnormal behaviour (of which stereotypy is a 166 
type) is often regarded as an indicator of poor welfare since this behaviour can be 167 
associated with physiological and behavioural measures of stress (Mason and 168 
Rushen 2006). The evidence linking stereotypy and poor welfare is, however, 169 
mixed: a review of 90 studies in a range of species found that comparing 170 
between environments or regimes, those where the subjects stereotyped more 171 
invariably also scored lower on additional welfare measures, but within a group of 172 
animals under the same husbandry regime, 60% of studies showed that 173 
performance of stereotypies was associated with better welfare whilst the 174 
remainder showed the opposite (Mason and Latham 2004).  175 
Given the above, we hypothesised that the presence of stereotyping 176 
behaviour in individual starlings should reflect stable individual differences in 177 
affective state (trait anxiety), and hence performance on a judgement bias task. 178 
If stereotyping birds are more pessimistic then we argue that stereotypic 179 
behaviour is an indicator of poor welfare within starlings sharing the same 180 
environment (and vice versa). However, any difference in cognition related to 181 
stereotypic behaviour is of importance for future studies using captive birds with 182 
stereotypies.   183 
 184 
Methods 185 
Subjects and Husbandry 186 
The subjects were eight European starlings (four males and four females) caught 187 
from the wild under license from Natural England. An equal number of juveniles 188 
(birds in their first year) and adults were used. Both sex and age were 189 
counterbalanced for position in the experimental laboratory and time of 190 
behavioural testing. Prior to the experiment the subjects were group-housed in an 191 
indoor aviary (2.4 x 2.15 x 2.3 m) with wood chippings covering the floor, dead 192 
trees for perching and cover, and shallow trays of water for bathing. At the start 193 
of the experiment, the birds were moved into individual cages (75 cm wide x 45 194 
cm deep x 44 cm high) where visual and auditory contact with at least four 195 
conspecifics was possible. Previous studies in solitary-housed starlings have 196 
shown that differences in cage dimensions and enrichments cause changes in 197 
  
7 
behaviour, condition and affective state (Bateson & Matheson 2007; Matheson et 198 
al. 2008; Asher et al. 2009), hence we were confident that the stress of individual 199 
housing would not cause a ceiling effect constraint in the present study. During all 200 
training phases the cages were furnished with enrichments suggested to improve 201 
the welfare of captive starlings, namely: natural branches, a water bath and a 202 
tray of bark chippings. The light:dark cycle was maintained at 14:10 hours. At all 203 
times, other than those described below, the subjects had ad libitum access to 204 
Purina kitten food, supplemented with fruit and mealworms (Tenebrio larvae). 205 
Drinking water was available at all times.  206 
The birds were subject to the same daily routine throughout the study: 207 
cage husbandry at 8:00 a.m., followed by two hours of food deprivation to 208 
increase the subjects’ motivation for the learning task, followed by approximately 209 
one hour of experimental trials (either learning or performing the cognitive bias 210 
task – see below). On completion of the trials, the birds were once more allowed 211 
to feed ad libitum. Due to the staggering of trials (four birds were tested at a 212 
time), all experimental procedures were completed by approximately midday.  213 
The birds’ behaviour in the absence of the experimenter was recorded 214 
using two video cameras. Four birds were recorded per half hour between 3:00 215 
and 4:00 p.m. The order of recording was counterbalanced such that each bird 216 
was recorded alternately from 3:00-3:30 or 3:30-4:00 on each day. 217 
Cognitive Bias Task 218 
We used a visual conditional discrimination task with differential rewards whereby 219 
the birds had to attend to the colour of the background (S+ or S-) to predict 220 
which of two visually distinct dishes placed on it contained a hidden treat and 221 
which was empty (see Fig. 1a). In S+ trials the treat was of a higher value than 222 
in S- trials. This difference in the level of reinforcement was required to ensure 223 
that active responses would be given to both the S+ and S- stimuli but that these 224 
responses could be differentiated by the subjects’ motivation to exploit the 225 
reward. Once birds had learnt this discrimination the test of cognitive bias 226 
involved presenting intermediate backgrounds between S+ and S- and recording 227 
which of the two dishes the bird chose in extinction (see Fig. 1b). We predicted 228 
that a more pessimistic bird would be more likely to interpret the ambiguous 229 
background as S-, and would therefore be more likely to choose the dish 230 
reinforced in S- trials. Matheson (2007) has previously piloted a version of this 231 
choice task in starlings. 232 
 233 
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a) 
b) 
 
Fig. 1 (a) Details of the conditional discrimination task. The reward for a correct 
decision in the S+ trials was three mealworms, in the S- trials it was one 
mealworm. (b) Details of the cognitive bias test showing the three ambiguous 
probe background shades and our interpretation of the birds’ choices. 
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Apparatus. Two opaque Petri dishes (5 cm diameter x 0.5 cm high) were 234 
mounted 3 cm apart on a ceramic tile (15 cm x 15 cm). The background colour of 235 
the tile was used as the discriminative stimulus (S+ or S-) and was altered by 236 
affixing printed paper to the tile (Fig. 1a). S+ was printed using the settings of 237 
Hue 0°; Saturation 0%; and Brightness 40% in Microsoft Powerpoint, and is 238 
henceforth referred to as 60% grey. S- was printed using: Hue 0°; Saturation 239 
0%; and Brightness 100%, and is henceforth referred to as 0% grey. The 240 
intermediate stimuli used as ‘probes’ for cognitive bias assessment were printed 241 
using the same Hue and Saturation values but varying Brightness to 55%, 70% 242 
or 85% giving shades henceforth referred to as 45%, 30% and 15% grey 243 
respectively (Fig. 1b). All subjects were trained to associate the 60% grey 244 
background (i.e. S+) with a three-mealworms reward and the 0% grey 245 
background (i.e. S-) with a one-mealworm reward (Matheson’s (2007) data 246 
showed that there was no effect of whether the higher reward occurred at the 247 
dark or light end of the stimulus spectrum). Pilot experiments had established 248 
that starlings in the same experimental set-up expressed a significant preference 249 
for three mealworms over one mealworm, confirming our assumption that the 250 
larger reward is of higher value. The Petri dishes were covered by circular 251 
cardboard lids (6.5 cm diameter) printed with one of two distinct stimuli (a red 252 
triangle or a green cross) that signalled which of the dishes contained the reward. 253 
The stimuli on the lids were also replicated on paper circles that were glued to the 254 
inside bottom of the Petri dishes (such that they were visible below the reward 255 
once the lid had been removed). Pilot experiments had also established that 256 
these stimuli were easily discriminable to the birds. Half of the birds were trained 257 
to associate the red triangle with the 3-mealworm reward and the green cross 258 
with the 1-mealworm reward whilst the other half were trained to the reverse 259 
assignment.  260 
 Training the birds for the cognitive bias task involved three phases: 261 
learning to flip lids, no-choice learning of the S+/S- conditional discrimination and 262 
free-choice learning of the full task with no ambiguous intermediates.  263 
 264 
Training lid-flipping. A tile with a single, centrally placed Petri dish and a plain 265 
yellow cardboard lid were used in the initial lid-flipping training. The birds were 266 
rewarded with a mealworm placed on the yellow lid that was in turn placed on the 267 
tile. To facilitate learning of the lid-flipping task, the lid was then moved so as to 268 
cover more of the Petri dish whilst the mealworm was moved to within the dish 269 
(though still visible). In order, the lid was placed: on the ceramic tile, next to the 270 
dish which contained the mealworm; leaning against the dish but not obscuring 271 
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the contents at all; progressively obscuring more of the contents (i.e. ¼ on, ½ 272 
on, ¾ on) until it covered the entire dish and the contents could only be seen and 273 
recovered by moving the lid aside. Sixteen trials were given each day, each 274 
lasting for 60 s with a 180-s inter-trial interval (ITI). The bird was required to eat 275 
the mealworm within 60 s or the previous training stage was repeated. The bird 276 
was considered to have learnt to lid-flip once it had completed 16 consecutive 277 
trials with the lid fully covering the dish. This training phase continued until all 278 
birds had learnt the task.  279 
 280 
Training the conditional discrimination. Next, birds were given a no-choice 281 
task using the two backgrounds (S+ and S-) and two lid-types that would be 282 
used in the final experiment (red triangle and green cross). They were presented 283 
with one open dish and one covered dish. The covered petri dish was always 284 
represented by the correct choice given the background context (i.e. if a 60% 285 
grey background was shown then only the correct lid would be present on a Petri 286 
dish and this would contain the 3-mealworms reward). Trials were separated into 287 
blocks such that each bird had six presentations of the 60% grey background in a 288 
row followed by six presentations of the 0% grey background with the order of 289 
the blocks alternating between days. Each trial lasted 60 s with a 180-s ITI. Upon 290 
completion of the 12 trials, the birds were then given six probe trials. In these the 291 
birds were presented with a choice of both lids; beneath the correct lid (given the 292 
background context) was the appropriate reward. Half of the probe trials used the 293 
60% grey background and half used the 0% grey with the order pseudo-294 
randomised. The birds were considered to have learnt the discrimination when 295 
they were above significance on the binomial test over the course of three days of 296 
testing (14 correct choices out of 18). This phase continued for all birds until the 297 
last subject had learnt the discrimination.  298 
Training partial reinforcement. Next, free-choice trials were given, and the 299 
probability of reward was gradually reduced using randomly interspersed 300 
unrewarded trials. Fifteen trials were conducted per day in this phase (again with 301 
a trial duration of 60 s and ITI of 180 s). Of these trials, all were rewarded on the 302 
first day, only 12 were rewarded on the second and third days, and only 10 were 303 
rewarded on the fourth day. The last day corresponded exactly to the trials that 304 
would be conducted as part of the cognitive bias task: 15 trials, five of which 305 
would not be reinforced. Reduction in the reinforcement probability was intended 306 
to prolong the conditioned response (CR) during the cognitive bias trials when 307 
ambiguous probe trials would be unrewarded and hence would cause the CR to 308 
extinguish.  309 
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 310 
Cognitive bias trials. The experimental cognitive bias test involved one session 311 
of 15 trials per day. Of these, five trials were reinforced presentations of the 60% 312 
grey background, five trials were reinforced presentations of the 0% grey 313 
background, two trials were unreinforced presentations of the 60% and 0% grey 314 
backgrounds and the remaining three were unreinforced presentations of each of 315 
the intermediate, ambiguous backgrounds (15, 30 and 45% grey). The order of 316 
presentation was pseudo-random, although we avoided contiguous unrewarded 317 
trials. As in the training trials, if a choice was not expressed within 60 s then the 318 
trial was terminated and the usual ITI was observed. 319 
In each phase of the experiment the choice made on every trial was 320 
recorded for each subject. A choice was either recorded as appropriate for S+ 321 
(indicative of an optimistic bias) or appropriate for S- (indicative of a pessimistic 322 
bias). In addition, the time taken from presentation of the tile until a choice was 323 
expressed was also recorded (defined as when the lid was moved such that the 324 
bird could observe the reward). Latency has been successfully used as a response 325 
variable in previous cognitive bias studies with rats (Burman et al. 2008a), and 326 
typically correlates well with choice in previous studies with starlings (e.g. 327 
Bateson and Kacelnik 1995).  328 
Housing manipulations 329 
The cognitive bias trials were run daily over the course of three weeks whilst 330 
environmental enrichment in the cages was varied each week in a repeated 331 
measures design. For the first and third weeks the birds were in environmentally 332 
enriched conditions similar to those from prior cognitive bias experiments in 333 
starlings (natural wood branches; water for bathing; and a tray filled with bark 334 
for natural probing opportunities: Bateson and Matheson 2007). For the second 335 
week these enrichments were removed (non-enriched conditions) and the birds 336 
were left with the empty water and bark containers and uniform dowel perches. 337 
In order to standardise and minimise the disruption caused by the experimenter 338 
physically changing the housing conditions, the birds were caught and transferred 339 
to new, appropriately furnished (enriched/unenriched) cages. This was done on 340 
the day before each week of cognitive bias trials began (i.e. they were transferred 341 
three times at weekly intervals).  342 
Scoring stereotypic behaviour 343 
The most easily quantifiable stereotypy in caged starlings is a complete 344 
backwards aerial flip (or somersault; Greenwood et al. 2004; Brilot et al. 2009a). 345 
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In previous work on stereotypic behaviour from this data set, we counted the 346 
number of somersaults for each bird, classifying a somersault as being any 347 
movement where the bird’s feet passed above its head (Brilot et al. 2009a). 348 
These counts were scored, using J-Watcher v1.0 (Blumstein et al. 2000), from 349 
one half-hour recording per week for each subject for the six weeks of the 350 
training period prior to the cognitive bias trials. Since not all birds exhibited 351 
somersaulting, we classified each as having exhibited somersaulting behaviour or 352 
not. We know from a previous study using data from these subjects that 353 
somersaulting behaviour is closely related to other abnormal repetitive 354 
behaviours, is associated with more repetitive movement patterns and with 355 
higher activity levels (Brilot et al. 2009a). Somersaulting therefore acts as a 356 
useful proxy measure for generally abnormal and repetitive behaviour. 357 
Statistical Analysis 358 
All statistical analyses were carried out using SPSS 16.0 for Mac (SPSS Inc., 359 
Chicago, IL, U.S.A.). All data were modelled using repeated measures General 360 
Linear Models (GLMs), with assumptions being checked and the data being 361 
transformed prior to analysis where appropriate. Some of the birds developed a 362 
side bias during the three weeks of cognitive bias trials; we reduced the effect of 363 
the bias by discarding data from a bird for any day when it failed to reach 364 
criterion (at least 10 out of 12 correct) for the subset of trials with the trained 365 
backgrounds (0% and 60% grey). Excluded data comprised 8 out of 56 bird days 366 
(4 of which were for one subject) for week 1; 9 out of 56 bird days for week 2 367 
(spread across four birds); and none in the last week (one bird day comprises 368 
data from one subject for one day). Since we artificially reduced the variance in 369 
the response to the trained unambiguous stimuli, we excluded the data from 370 
them in our analyses.  371 
Ethical note 372 
Our study adhered to the Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour’s 373 
Guidelines for the Use of Animals in Research and also passed internal ethical 374 
review. Birds were inspected on a daily basis by the experimenter, were released 375 
back into free-flight aviaries after the experiment and showed no signs of adverse 376 
effects. Following completion of our studies, they received a full health inspection 377 
by a qualified veterinarian prior to release at the original capture site. 378 
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Results 379 
Cognitive Bias Task 380 
Training. The birds took 4.38 ± 2.13 days (mean±sd) to learn the lid-flipping 381 
task. All subjects had learnt the task by day seven. The birds took an additional 382 
13.25 ± 4.33 (mean±sd) days to reach criterion on the conditional discrimination 383 
task. All birds had learnt the task after 20 days of discrimination training. In the 384 
last three days of discrimination training, before partial reinforcement was 385 
introduced, there was a difference in the latency of the birds to make a choice 386 
with 0% and 60% grey backgrounds, with birds being slower in the 0% grey 387 
background trials where the reward was only one mealworm compared with 60% 388 
grey background trials where the reward was three mealworms (paired t-test: t7 389 
= 2.463, p = 0.043). 390 
 391 
Probability of choosing the stimulus associated with the larger reward. 392 
To establish whether cognitive bias was altered by our housing manipulation, we 393 
compared the probability of the subjects choosing the lid stimulus associated with 394 
the larger reward for the three ambiguous probe shades in each of the three 395 
weeks of the test (see Fig. 2 which plots the data from all unreinforced trials 396 
across all five shades, both ambiguous probes and non-ambiguous trained 397 
stimuli, to allow a baseline comparison). We used probe background value and 398 
week number as categorical within-subjects factors in a repeated-measures 399 
ANOVA, with the probability of choosing the lid stimulus associated with the 400 
larger reward as the dependent variable. There was a significant effect of the 401 
probe background shade on the birds’ choices (F2,8 = 58.90, p < 0.001) but there 402 
was no significant effect of either the week of testing (F2,8 = 0.14, p = 0.871) or 403 
the interaction between the week of testing and probe background shade (F4,16 = 404 
0.01, p = 1.00). Since three of the subjects did not respond to at least one probe 405 
background value for at least one of the weeks of testing, only five subjects could 406 
be included in a repeated-measures ANOVA. This statistical test is therefore likely 407 
to be conservative. To reduce the likelihood of a type II error, we re-ran the 408 
analysis using the data from each probe background value in turn and included 409 
week as the only independent variable. This revealed that week of testing still 410 
had no significant effect on the choices expressed (Probe 15% grey background: 411 
F2,12 = 0.24, p = 0.792; Probe 30% grey background: F2,8 = 0.02, p = 0.982; 412 
Probe 45% grey background: F2,14 = 1.01, p = 0.390; changes in the degrees of 413 
freedom represent changes in sample size since some subjects failed to give a 414 
response to the probe in a given week).  415 
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Fig. 2 Probability of choosing the stimulus associated with the higher reward 
during cognitive bias trials averaged across all subjects. Percentage grey values 
signify which background context was presented. Light hatched bars represent 
choices during week 1 (enriched conditions); dotted bars represent choices during 
week 2 (unenriched conditions); dark hatched bars represent choices during week 
3 (enriched conditions). Bars show the mean for the 8 birds±one standard error.
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 416 
Latency to choose. Although the choice data showed no effect of our housing 417 
manipulation, there remained the possibility that the birds’ expectancy of reward 418 
size in the ambiguous probe trials was reflected in their latencies to respond. 419 
Where a bird failed to exhibit a choice within the time allowed, it was allocated 420 
the maximum trial duration of 60 s. We calculated the latency to flip a lid for each 421 
probe stimulus relative to the 3-mealworm reinforced stimulus (60% grey; Fig. 422 
3). We predicted an increase in latency in non-enriched conditions (reflecting 423 
pessimism regarding the expected reward), followed by a decrease in latency on 424 
return to enriched conditions (reflecting recovered optimism). However, 425 
inspection of Fig. 3 suggests that if anything, latencies in the ambiguous probe 426 
trials increased across the three weeks of testing. A repeated-measures ANOVA 427 
(with week number and probe background as within-subjects fixed factors) 428 
showed that latencies differed significantly across the probe background value 429 
and across the three weeks of trials (Probe value: F2,14 = 10.22 p = 0.002; Week 430 
number: F2,14 = 7.92 p = 0.005). Post-hoc analysis using t-tests (with a 431 
Bonferroni correction applied) revealed a significant difference in the latency to 432 
respond to the 30% and 45% grey background probes (p = 0.001), but all other 433 
pairwise comparisons were non-significant (p > 0.18 for all). Similarly, 434 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc analysis revealed a significant difference in the 435 
latency to respond for weeks 1 and 3 (p = 0.039) but all other pairwise 436 
comparisons between weeks were non-significant (p > 0.15 for all). There was no 437 
significant interaction effect of the probe background value and week number on 438 
the latency to choose (Mauchly’s test revealed that the assumption of sphericity 439 
was not tenable (χ9 = 32.48, p < 0.001), therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser 440 
correction was applied: F1.94, 13.55 = 0.64, p = 0.537).  441 
 442 
Cognitive Bias Task and Individual Behavioural Differences 443 
To ascertain whether presence of stereotypic behaviour (as an indicator of 444 
affective state) predicts the probability of choosing the stimulus associated with 445 
the larger reward we conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with probe 446 
background value as a within-subjects factor and the presence or not of 447 
somersaulting behaviour as a between-subjects factor. We used only the data 448 
from the first week of trials for this analysis to minimise the effects of learning 449 
observed in the second and third weeks and to avoid any potential confound from 450 
the housing manipulation. The data on somersaulting showed that only three out 451 
of eight subjects demonstrated somersaulting behaviour during the period prior 452 
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Fig. 3 Latency to approach and flip the lid averaged for each background context 
stimulus. The latency is corrected for each individual bird by dividing the actual 
mean latency by the mean latency to flip the lid of the rewarded “three-
mealworms” stimulus (i.e. the 60% grey background trials) during the same 
week of trials. The percentage grey values signify which background context was 
presented. Light hatched bars represent latencies during week 1 (enriched 
conditions); dotted bars represent latencies during week 2 (unenriched 
conditions); dark hatched bars represent latencies during week 3 (enriched 
conditions). Bars show the mean for the 8 birds±one standard error.
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to the cognitive bias trials (see Brilot et al. 2009a). None of the subjects showed 453 
somersaulting behaviour during the three-week cognitive bias trial period. The 454 
analysis showed that there was a significant effect of the probe background value 455 
on the stimulus chosen (F2,12 = 32.33, p < 0.001). Post-hoc analysis (with 456 
Bonferroni corrections applied) revealed that there was a significant difference in 457 
the response to the 15% vs. 45% grey backgrounds (p = 0.002) and the 30% vs. 458 
45% grey backgrounds (p = 0.001) but there was no significant difference in the 459 
response to the 15% vs. 30% grey backgrounds (p = 0.149). Somersaulting 460 
behaviour had an effect on the choices made, manifested as a significant 461 
interaction between probe background value and somersaulting (F2,12 = 4.40, p = 462 
0.037; Fig. 4), though there was no significant main effect of somersaulting (F1,7 463 
= 1.56, p = 0.259). To establish the meaning of this interaction, we conducted 464 
repeated contrasts which revealed a significant interaction when comparing the 465 
choices made by stereotyping and non-stereotyping individuals in response to the 466 
15% background probe vs. the 30% background probe (F1,6 = 6.36, p = 0.045) 467 
and the 30% vs. 45% background probe (F1,6 = 11.54, p = 0.015). Examination 468 
of figure 4 confirms this interaction: somersaulting birds were more likely to 469 
choose the stimulus associated with the lower reward value, but this difference 470 
was only expressed in response to the 30% grey background probe.  471 
 472 
 473 
 474 
Discussion 475 
In this paper we set out first, to develop an improved cognitive bias task for 476 
starlings, and, second, to extend previous work in animals by asking whether 477 
cognitive biases are correlated with individual differences in the incidence of 478 
abnormal behaviour. Although we succeeded in training birds on our novel 479 
cognitive bias task, we failed to find the predicted changes in cognitive bias, 480 
expected with changes in housing conditions. However, we did find that 481 
performance on the task was predicted by individual differences in whether or not 482 
birds showed stereotypic somersaulting behaviour. Below we discuss the 483 
explanations for these findings and their implications in the context of our original 484 
aims.  485 
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Fig. 4 Probability of choosing the stimulus associated with the larger reward for 
each background context stimulus in the first week of cognitive bias trials 
(enriched conditions). The subjects are divided into those that exhibited 
somersaulting behaviour at some stage during the first six weeks of the training 
period (dashed line) and those that did not (solid black line). Data points show 
the mean for the 8 birds±one standard error. 
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Cognitive bias tasks and learning 486 
The birds’ judgment biases, as measured by their choice of which lid to flip during 487 
ambiguous probe trials, were not affected in any consistent manner by our 488 
manipulation of their housing conditions (Fig. 2). The cognitive bias task 489 
therefore failed to detect any changes in affective state that might have been 490 
induced by the change in environmental conditions. However, this is unsurprising 491 
given the additional data on the increase in latencies to choose across the three 492 
weeks of cognitive bias testing (Fig. 3). This increase is inconsistent with a 493 
cognitive bias interpretation, and instead suggests that the birds were learning 494 
that their choice in ambiguous probe trials was never rewarded with mealworms. 495 
Indeed, by the third week of the testing, two birds completely failed to make a 496 
choice in the 30% grey background probe trials. We therefore conclude that the 497 
birds learnt quickly that the intermediate probe stimuli were never associated 498 
with reinforcement, thus rendering the probe trials unambiguous by the second 499 
week of testing, and the task ineffective for detecting changes in affective state. 500 
Ours is the first cognitive bias experiment to find evidence for such rapid learning 501 
and loss of ambiguity in probe trials raising the question of why this occurred. 502 
 The experiment presented is the only cognitive bias task, that we are 503 
aware of, that has employed this specific repeated measures methodology (i.e. 504 
from condition A to condition B and return to condition A). The rationale that this 505 
allowed each bird to be its own control was justified given the large range of 506 
inter-individual variability we found in response to the ambiguous probes in the 507 
initial stages. A between-groups design would have required greater sample sizes 508 
to detect similar effects given this noise from individual differences. However, the 509 
repeated measures design also meant that learning became a significant factor in 510 
reducing the sensitivity of the cognitive bias measure. The cognitive bias testing 511 
lasted 21 days with the birds having 21 exposures to each probe stimulus over 512 
this time. In the two previous cognitive bias experiments on starlings (Bateson 513 
and Matheson 2007; Matheson et al. 2008), the test phases lasted for 10 and 20 514 
days respectively and the birds had 36 and up to 80 exposures to each probe 515 
stimulus over this time respectively. It is not possible to compare the latter study 516 
with the current study since the stimuli used were entirely different. However, the 517 
former study (Bateson and Matheson 2007) used similar stimuli and training 518 
techniques to the current experiment. In fact, the stimuli used in the current 519 
study were actually drawn from a smaller range than in Bateson and Matheson 520 
(2007) and therefore we would have predicted that if anything, the ambiguous 521 
stimuli would have been harder to distinguish from the trained S+ and S- stimuli, 522 
not easier. 523 
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In an attempt to resolve this apparent contradiction we re-examined the 524 
data presented in Bateson and Matheson (2007) to investigate whether it could 525 
be re-interpreted as the result of learning as opposed to a change in cognitive 526 
bias. If the birds learnt that the ambiguous stimuli were never reinforced, this 527 
would have resulted in a reduced probability of lid flipping in the second 528 
treatment received by the birds, and hence behaviour interpreted as indicating a 529 
more pessimistic cognitive bias in the second treatment. In fact, this is exactly 530 
what was observed. Fig. 2 of Bateson and Matheson (2007) shows a reduced 531 
probability of lid-flipping when the birds moved from enriched to standard 532 
conditions. This was interpreted as a cognitive bias shift, since birds in a more 533 
negative affective state would be more likely to negatively interpret the stimulus 534 
and therefore avoid the lids. However, in the same figure, the birds that received 535 
the treatments in the reverse order (i.e. standard to enriched) also showed a 536 
(non-significant) reduction in lid-flipping in their second treatment. Taken 537 
together with the evidence from the current study showing the same trend, these 538 
data strongly suggest that the birds in Bateson and Matheson (2007) were 539 
learning that the ambiguous probes were never reinforced as opposed to 540 
exhibiting a change in cognitive bias.   541 
The possibility of subjects learning rapidly that ambiguous probe trials are 542 
unreinforced is therefore a difficulty for experiments designed to detect changes 543 
in cognitive bias. The most successful cognitive bias experiments have most likely 544 
circumvented this problem by using a between-subjects design with a short 545 
duration of testing with ambiguous probes (Harding et al. 2004; Burman et al. 546 
2008a). However, even with these designs, the possibility remains that 547 
reductions in the probability of responding or latency to respond, interpreted as 548 
more pessimistic judgment biases, could actually be attributable to effects of 549 
stress on speed of learning. Though the general validity of the Yerkes-Dodson law 550 
(that there is an inverted U-response function linking stress and learning speed) 551 
is questioned, there is confirmatory evidence linking mild levels of stress and 552 
improved memory formation (Mendl 1999). For instance, there is evidence in rats 553 
that pharmacologically-induced mild stress (administration of low doses of 554 
corticosterone) can enhance learning (Okuda et al. 2004), but only under 555 
conditions of emotional arousal (in this case response to a novel object). It is 556 
therefore a possibility that experiments aimed at assessing a cognitive bias may 557 
be confounded by an additional interaction between stress and learning (as well 558 
as stress and cognitive interpretations). In short, individuals under mildly 559 
stressful conditions may learn more quickly that ambiguous probes are 560 
unreinforced and therefore show a reduced response in both go/go and go/no-go 561 
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experimental designs. A potential solution to this difficulty lies in the use of 562 
paradigms that require only a single exposure to ambiguous, unreinforced probe 563 
stimuli where learning cannot be a confound (see Brilot et al. 2009b for a first 564 
attempt at such a task).  565 
Cognitive bias and individual behavioural differences 566 
The results from the first week of cognitive bias testing suggest that performance 567 
is predicted by whether starlings display stereotypic behaviour in the form of 568 
somersaulting. Individuals that performed somersaults demonstrated a 569 
significantly more pessimistic interpretation of the most ambiguous (30% grey) 570 
probe stimulus than non-stereotyping individuals. Though there proved to be no 571 
relationship between responses to the 15% and 45% grey probes and 572 
somersaulting behaviour, this is unsurprising given the reduced ambiguity of 573 
these probes as compared to the 30% grey background. Fig. 3 shows that these 574 
two probes were treated as approximately equivalent to the trained S+ and S- 575 
backgrounds as judged by the birds’ choice responses. Any sensitivity to 576 
individual differences in response was therefore likely overshadowed by a 577 
generalised, strong conditioned response to the previously-encountered stimuli. 578 
This study examined individual differences in somersaulting behaviour and 579 
the relationship between this stereotypy and cognitive bias. Elsewhere we have 580 
analysed data on behaviour patterns in the learning phase of the current 581 
experiment (Brilot et al. 2009a). This showed that repetitiveness of movement 582 
patterns, abnormal stereotypic behaviour (including somersaulting), and the use 583 
of abnormal perching locations are all positively correlated in a complex that is 584 
suggestive of a behavioural response to caging. Additionally, it is known that an 585 
increase in the repetitiveness of behaviour is correlated with the housing 586 
conditions of starlings (both with cage type and enrichments: Asher 2007; Asher 587 
et al. 2009). There is some evidence to suggest that this may be related to a 588 
thwarted escape response, as originally suggested by Maddocks et al. (2002). 589 
Our findings here are therefore suggestive that performance on the cognitive bias 590 
task, and by implication affective state, relates to this suite of abnormal and 591 
repetitive behaviour measures. As outlined in the introduction, it is generally 592 
considered that the presence of stereotypic behaviour indicates poor welfare 593 
when comparing differing housing regimes. However, the evidence for animals 594 
that share the same captive conditions is equivocal, with the majority of studies 595 
suggesting that stereotyping individuals actually display indicators of better 596 
welfare than non-stereotyping individuals (Mason and Latham 2004; Mason 597 
2006). The present study suggests that the presence of stereotypic behaviour in 598 
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starlings is an indicator of poor welfare, even when comparing individuals who 599 
share the same housing conditions.  600 
There are a number of reasons why stereotypic behaviour might be an 601 
indicator of negative affective state and therefore of poor welfare (Mason and 602 
Latham 2004). We suggest that the typical starling stereotypy, somersaulting, 603 
observed in our study, fulfils the criteria in Table 2 of Mason and Latham (2004) 604 
for a stereotypic behaviour that is an index of poor welfare (specifically an index 605 
of frustration: Table 3, Mason & Latham 2004). First, the stereotypy is not a 606 
suitable replacement for the natural activity. Since we hypothesise that the 607 
behaviour patterns and stereotypic behaviour are indicators of a thwarted escape 608 
response, there is no likelihood that they act as a suitable substitute. Second, it 609 
seems unlikely that this behaviour has a ‘mantra effect’, i.e. a positively 610 
reinforcing ability to reduce stress, though the present data do not allow us to 611 
exclude this possibility. Third, stereotypic behaviour in our study was embedded 612 
within a suite of flexible behaviours. The individuals that demonstrated 613 
somersaulting behaviour were still able to attend to and complete all training 614 
tasks. There was no negative relationship between stereotypic behaviour and the 615 
length of training across the subjects as might be expected if stereotyping 616 
individuals were unwilling or unable to attend to external stimuli. Fourth and 617 
finally, stereotypic behaviour seems to have been elicited ‘appropriately’ within 618 
the context of an escape response. Somersaulting behaviour was expressed most 619 
prominently during the first three weeks of captivity (Brilot et al. 2009a) and 620 
subsequently decreased. However, though somersaulting decreased over time 621 
during the experimental video recordings (when no humans were present), it was 622 
still stimulated to an extent by the presence of the experimenter during daily 623 
cognitive bias training and husbandry (personal observations). This suggests that 624 
the thwarted escape response was heightened by the presence of a perceived 625 
threat and therefore stereotypic behaviour was manifested. Given that the 626 
stereotypic somersaulting behaviour of starlings fits the criteria for a good 627 
indicator of poor welfare, we suggest that the present study indicates that 628 
starlings that display more repetitive behaviour patterns and stereotypic 629 
behaviours, are also suffering from a more negative affective state (as measured 630 
by the cognitive bias task).  631 
In conclusion, our study has revealed that rapid learning of non-reinforced 632 
ambiguous probe stimuli can be a problem in cognitive bias tasks. Subjects 633 
learning that ambiguous probe trials are never reinforced not only precluded us 634 
from detecting changes in affective state with changes in housing conditions in 635 
the current experiment, but may also have implications for other studies 636 
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attempting to establish a cognitive bias where the test phase is not sufficiently 637 
short. Performance on the cognitive bias task did, however, reflect behaviour in 638 
captivity with regards to the incidence of abnormal repetitive behaviour (namely 639 
the somersaulting stereotypy). We suggest that the wider suite of behavioural 640 
traits related to repetitive behaviour is indicative of a stress response in captive 641 
starlings that also reflects a more negative affective state. The cognitive bias 642 
methodology therefore has merit in revealing individual differences in affective 643 
state.  644 
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Figure captions 736 
Fig. 1 (a) Details of the conditional discrimination task. The reward for a correct 737 
decision in the S+ trials was three mealworms, in the S- trials it was one 738 
mealworm. (b) Details of the cognitive bias test showing the three ambiguous 739 
probe background shades and our interpretation of the birds’ choices.  740 
Fig. 2 Probability of choosing the stimulus associated with the higher reward 741 
during cognitive bias trials averaged across all subjects. Percentage grey values 742 
signify which background context was presented. Light hatched bars represent 743 
choices during week 1 (enriched conditions); dotted bars represent choices during 744 
week 2 (unenriched conditions); dark hatched bars represent choices during week 745 
3 (enriched conditions). Bars show the mean for the 8 birds±one standard error. 746 
Fig. 3 Latency to approach and flip the lid averaged for each background context 747 
stimulus. The latency is corrected for each individual bird by dividing the actual 748 
mean latency by the mean latency to flip the lid of the rewarded “three-749 
mealworms” stimulus (i.e. the 60% grey background trials) during the same 750 
week of trials. The percentage grey values signify which background context was 751 
presented. Light hatched bars represent latencies during week 1 (enriched 752 
conditions); dotted bars represent latencies during week 2 (unenriched 753 
conditions); dark hatched bars represent latencies during week 3 (enriched 754 
conditions). Bars show the mean for the 8 birds±one standard error. 755 
Fig. 4 Probability of choosing the stimulus associated with the larger reward for 756 
each background context stimulus in the first week of cognitive bias trials 757 
(enriched conditions). The subjects are divided into those that exhibited 758 
somersaulting behaviour at some stage during the first six weeks of the training 759 
period (dashed line) and those that did not (solid black line). Data points show 760 
the mean for the 8 birds±one standard error. 761 
